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1 Introduction
Why do firms offer different employment contracts to workers with different labour market status
and experience? Many economists would argue that since experience is positively correlated with
a worker’s skills and unemployment depreciates human capital, workers are just being paid their
marginal product at every point in time. This interpretation is so deeply rooted in labour economics
that it is used as the standard explanation of why we observe positive returns to experience in wage
equations. Moreover, it is also widely used to explain the adverse effects that unemployment
inflicts on future earnings. The present paper argues that search frictions provides an alternative
answer. We construct an equilibrium model in which firms offer wage-tenure contracts conditional
on employment status and initial experience to discriminate between otherwise identical workers.
We show that firms offer relatively higher paying jobs to employed workers and that outside offers
become more generous with experience.
Recent theoretical analyses of non-stationary firm wage policies in the equilibrium search lit-
erature à la Burdett and Mortensen (1998), have enriched existing theories of wage dispersion
and workers’ labour market histories. In these models, wage dispersion is not only a market phe-
nomenon, but can also be observed within each firm. In turn, changes in a worker’s wage over
time are determined by both job mobility and positive returns to tenure. These results are obtained
under two types of wage policies, which differ in the firm’s ability to wage discriminate otherwise
similar workers. The degree of discrimination is reflected in assumptions on the information avail-
able to the firm when recruiting a worker and on the firm’s policy when confronted with outside
competition for its employees.
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Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002 a) analyse the case of complete information and counter-offering,
in which firms perfectly discriminate workers by their reservation wages. The firm posts a single
wage that is re-negotiated every time the worker finds an alternative offer. Positive tenure effects
are driven by the ability of a worker to engage his employer with other potential employers into
Bertrand competition. Burdett and Coles (2003) and Stevens (2004) on the other hand, assume
firms have no information about the worker and do not counter-offer, or precommit not to do so.
The wage policy is similar to incentive/agency theory. In this case, firms post wage-tenure con-
tracts with an increasing wage profile, to reduce the quit probability of their employees. The firm
is able to minimise the expected loss caused by inefficient quits, by discriminating workers by their
tenure.
This framework provides powerful theoretical tools for the empirical analysis of traditional
issues in labour economics (see Manning, 2003 and Mortensen, 2003), promoting in particular
the understanding of wage variation. However, in many cases labour markets do not appear to
resemble the two extremes under which the theory is modelled. Firms do discriminate between
potential employees by observable characteristics and rarely engage in offer matching. Therefore
a more “realistic” setting is needed.
The present paper contributes to this literature by extending the analysis to an environment
in which firms condition their job offers upon workers’ observable characteristics that change
over time, precommitting not to counter-offer any outside offers. In particular, we analyse the
implications of this policy on the earnings distribution observed within each firm.1
1 In an earlier paper, Carrillo-Tudela (2004), we use a simple version of the Burdett and Mortensen model to
analyse the case in which firms discriminate between potential employees only by employment status. The present
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Following Stevens (2004), we assume workers are risk neutral and liquidity contrained. The
optimal wage-tenure contract for each level of initial experience and employment status is then
described by a step-contract. Effectively, for each type of employment status, we segment Stevens
homogenous case model into a continuum of markets (one for each experience) between which
workers transition and engage in on-the-job search.2 Given that firms always face outside compe-
tition for their employees, a step-contract is the only solution for the firm’s problem.
We construct an equilibrium in which outside offers are degenerate and firms compete in “pro-
motion” contracts. As in Carrillo-Tudela (2004) a “dual” labour market emerges within the firm
(see Doeringer and Piore, 1971). All firms offer two type of contracts: “bad” jobs with longer
probation periods to unemployed workers and “good” jobs with shorter ones to employed work-
ers. Worker turnover occurs in the direction of bad towards good jobs. Since employed workers
hired from unemployment earn less than their marginal revenue product until they get promoted,
search frictions imply firms will have incentives to recruit them at positive experience markets.
If firms offer contracts with short enough “probation” periods at the initial stages of a worker’s
career, outside offers become more generous with experience. In this case, firms find profitable to
offer more than the workers’ reservation value because they trade off a longer period during which
they make positive profit with a higher chance the worker will quit in the future.
An interesting feature of this equilibrium is that there exists worker cohort effects within a firm
paper extends this work to a more general environment.
2 This idea is similar to the one used in Van den Berg and Ridder (1998). They segment the homogenous Burdett
and Mortensen model into a large (but finite) number of markets, to analyse the impact of between-market population
heterogeneity in improving the fit of the earnings distribution. As in our case, in each particular market workers
and firms are identical and markets differ in observable characteristics such as worker’s age and educational level.
However, they do not consider the possibility of workers moving between these markets as their characteristics change.
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that depend on the level of experience at which they where hired. In turn, this implies that the
distribution of earnings within the firm is such that when controlling for experience there exits a
positive relation between tenure and earnings. Moreover, workers with the same tenure but with
more “outside firm” experience are higher in the earnings ladder. Empirical evidence of these
results can be found in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) and Medoff and Abraham (1980).
We perform several comparative statics exercises by numerically analysing the model and obtain
further insights on the interaction between the internal and external labour markets.
The next sections describe the general framework and discuss the workers’ and firms’ decision
problems. Section 5 generalises Stevens results and show that the optimal wage-tenure contract is
a step-contract for each level of initial experience and employment status. Sections 6 and 7, define
and construct the market equilibrium. Using simulations we present some comparative statics
exercises. Section 8 further discusses the results and concludes.
2 Basic Framework
Consider a labour market in steady state in which time is continuous and there is a fixed number
of workers and firms each of measure one. Workers can either be employed (e) or unemployed
(u) with experience, x, defined as total time spent in all previous employments. Firms post job
offers at a zero cost on a take it or leave it basis. Both unemployed and employed workers of
any experience search. Let 0 < λ < ∞ denote the common Poisson arrival rate of these offers.
Assume there is no recall should a worker quit or reject a job offer.3
3 Although the no recall assumption does not bind in equilibrium it is important as it much simplifies the analysis
that follows.
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Although we will argue that firms offer different contracts to different experienced workers
for reasons other than productivity, we start by given credit to the human capital explanation and
analyse the case in which experience and productivity are positively correlated. We then show that
this recruitment policy persists even when productivity is held constant. Hence, assume that when
entering the labour market each worker is endowed with the same initial level of general human
capital. As a worker gains more experience his human capital stock increases. Any worker with
experience x would then have accumulated the same units of human capital over his employments
spells. Firms use this human capital as a single input. All firms generate the same revenue, p(x), for
each worker of experience x they employ per unit of time. Assume p : + → P is continuously
differentiable, strictly increasing and concave, where for simplicity P ⊂ ++ is a bounded set
described by the interval [p, p].
A job offer is described by a wage contract. Upon a meeting firms are able to observe the
worker’s experience and labour market status and condition their offers upon these characteristics.
An important assumption is that firms pre-commit not to counter-offer any outside offer the worker
might receive in the future. Contracts are then contingent on the worker’s tenure, t, defined as time
spent working on the firm. A job offer is fully described by a wage-tenure contract conditional on
the worker’s initial experience and employment status.
An important simplification is that workers are liquidity constrained and cannot borrow against
future earnings. As in Stevens (2004) the lack of capital markets constrain the set of feasible
contracts available to the firm. In particular, they rule out contracts that require entry fees or
quitting payments from the worker. Formally, a wage contract is described by a right-continuous
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function wxi : + → W defined for all tenures t given employment status i = u, e and starting
experience x such that W ⊂ + is bounded from below by w ≥ 0.
Both agents have a zero rate of time preference. Firms are risk neutral and infinitely lived. The
objective of each firm is to maximize total steady state flow profits. Workers, on the other hand,
are also risk neutral but their lives are of uncertain duration. Any worker’s life is described by
an exponential random variable with parameter 0 < δ < ∞. The inflow rate of new unemployed
workers of zero experience into the market is δ.4 The objective of any worker is to maximize total
expected lifetime utility. Finally, let b denote the opportunity cost of employment per unit of time
and assume p > b > w.
3 Worker’s Payoffs and Job Search Strategies
Given contact with a firm, a worker of employment status i and experience x observes the posted
contract wxi . Let V xi denote his expected lifetime utility conditional on accepting it and using an
optimal quit strategy in the future. Further, let Fi(V xi | x) denote the distribution of starting payoffs
offered by firms to workers with employment status i and experience x. Random matching implies,
given contact with a firm, Fi(V xi | x) describes the probability that the outside offer has a value no
greater than V xi . Although Fi(. | x) will be endogenously determine in equilibrium, at this stage
assume it is continuous in x and has a bounded support. Let V xi and V
x
i denote the infimum and
supremum of the support for each i, x.
First consider the case of an unemployed worker. Let U(x) denote the expected lifetime payoff
4 Although agents do not discount the future, note that the worker’s “death rate”, δ, plays the role of a discount
rate.
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of this worker when he has experience x and follows an optimal search strategy. Conditional on
receiving a job offer, the definition of U(x) and the no recall assumption imply that his optimal
policy is described by: accept a job offer if and only if V xu ≥ U(x) and reject a job offer otherwise.
Since workers do not accumulate experience while unemployed, U(x) then solves the following
stationary Bellman equation
δU(x) = b + λ
∫ V xu
U(x)
[V xu − U(x)]dFu(V xu | x). (1)
Now consider an employed worker who has been hired from state i with starting experi-
ence x on a wage contract wix. Define V xi (t;wxi ) as this worker’s expected lifetime payoff at
tenure t when using an optimal quit strategy. Given any contract wxi and experience x + t where
V xi (t;w
x
i ) > U(x + t), the definition of V xi (.;wxi ) and the no recall assumption implies the
worker’s optimal strategy is to quit if and only if he receives a job offer which has starting value
V x+te > V
x
i (t;w
x
i ) and continue employment at the firm if and only if V x+te ≤ V xi (t;wxi ). Since
the worker gains experience while employed, V xi (.;wxi ) then satisfies the following non-stationary
Bellman equation
δV xi (t;w
x
i ) = w
x
i (t) +
dV xi (t;w
x
i )
dt
+ λ
∫ V x+te
V xi (t;w
x
i )
[V x+te − V xi (t;wxi )]dFe(V x+te | x + t), (2)
for i = u, e, and note that V xi (.;wxi ) is right-differentiable with respect to t at the point in which
wxi is discontinuous.5
However, if V xi (t;wxi ) < U(x+t) for some accumulated experience x+t, the worker’s optimal
5 See Van den Berg (1990)- Theorem 1 for a formal derivation of this equation and its properties.
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strategy is to quit into unemployment. To allow for this possibility define the set Υxi by
Υxi = {t ∈ + : V xi (t;wxi ) < U(x + t)} for i = u, e
and let txi = inf Υxi . Hence, txi denotes the tenure at which an employed worker hired from state
i with initial experience x optimally quits into unemployment. If V xi (t;wxi ) ≥ U(x + t) for all t,
then define txi = ∞ and the worker never quits into unemployment.
Note that given a wage contract wxi and tenure t < txi , a worker’s hazard rate is δ + λ[1 −
Fe(V
x
i (t;w
x
i ) | x + t)] for i = u, e. Hence, for tenures t < txi , the survival probability
ψxi (t;w
x
i ) = e
−   t0 [δ+λ(1−Fe(V xi (s;wxi )|x+s)]ds for i = u, e (3)
describes the probability a newly employed worker hired from state i with starting experience x
does not leave the firm before tenure t. If txi < ∞, then ψxi = 0 for all t ≥ txi and i = u, e.
4 Firm Payoffs and Optimal Strategies
As firms can perfectly discriminate by employment status and previous experience, to simplify
the exposition consider for each employment status i = u, e the market of experience x. In what
follows assume all firms make acceptable offers to unemployed workers such that V xe ≥ V xu ≥
U(x) for all x.6 We will show later that this assumption is satisfied in equilibrium.
First we analyse the market of unemployed workers with experience x. Let M(x) denote the
steady state number of unemployed workers with experience no greater than x and µ(x) denote
the steady state proportion of unemployed workers with experience x. Consider a firm which posts
6 Note that at x = 0 the only offer distribution that is defined is Fu(. | 0). As employed workers gain x = 0+
experience firms have the possibility of hiring them from a competing firm and hence Fe(. | x) is defined for all x > 0.
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a contract wxu and let V xu denote a worker’s expected lifetime payoff by accepting it. The firm’s
steady state flow profit per new hire in this market is then given by
Ωxu(V
x
u , w
x
u) = λµ(x)
[∫ ∞
0
ψxu(t;w
x
u)[p(x + t)− wxu(t)]dt
]
, (4)
where the first term is the probability of hiring an unemployed worker of experience x and the
second term is the firm’s expected profit per new hire. The firm’s total steady state flow profit in
the market of unemployed workers is then obtained by integrating (4) across all experience markets
Ωu(Wu) =
∫ ∞
0
λµ(x)
[∫ ∞
0
ψxu(t;w
x
u)[p(x + t)− wxu(t)]dt
]
dM(x),
where Wu denotes the set of tenure contracts, wxu, the firm offers to unemployed workers for each
experience x ≥ 0.
Next, consider the market of employed workers with experience x. Let N(x) denote the steady
state number of employed workers that have experience no greater than x and 1−G(V | x) denote
the steady state proportion of employed workers that currently have experience x and a lifetime
expected payoff of at least V. These two steady state measures include workers that where hired
from unemployment and from a competing firm. Consider a firm which posts a contract wxe and
let V xe denote a worker’s expected lifetime payoff by accepting it. Note G(V xe | x) describes the
probability that an employed worker of experience x earning V < V xe will accept the firms offer.
The firm’s steady state flow profit per new hire in the market of employed workers of experience
x is then given by
Ωxe(V
x
e , w
x
e ) = λG(V
x
e | x)
[∫ ∞
0
ψxe(t;w
x
e )[p(x + t)− wxe (t)]dt
]
. (5)
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The firm’s total steady state flow profit in the market of employed workers is obtained by integrat-
ing (5) across experience markets
Ωe(We) =
∫ ∞
0
λG(V xe | x)
[∫ ∞
0
ψxe(t;w
x
e )[p(x + t)− wxe (t)]dt
]
dN(x),
where We denotes the set of tenure contracts, wxe , the firm offers to employed workers for each
experience x > 0.
Hence a firm’s total steady state profit flow is given by
Ω(Wu,We) = Ωu(Wu) + Ωe(We).
The objective of each firm is to choose two sets of wage contracts {Wu,We}, one for each employ-
ment status, to maximise Ω(Wu,We) given Fu(. | x), Fe(. | x), U(x) for each market x and the
turnover strategies of workers described in the previous section.7 However, the no recall assump-
tion implies a firm can maximise Ω(Wu,We) by choosing Wi independently to maximise Ωi(Wi)
for each i = u, e. Furthermore, no recall also implies that for a given i the firm can choose wxi to
maximise Ωxi at each market x. This structure much simplifies the analysis as it allows us to focus
on the firm’s optimisation problem for each pair i, x.8
First, conditional on offering a new hire a starting payoff V xi an optimal contract in market x
solves the programming problem
max
wxi (.)≥w
∫ ∞
0
ψxi (t;w
x
i )[p(x + t)− wxi (t)]dt
7 Note that µ(x) and G(. | x) are functions of Fu(. | x) and Fe(. | x).
8 If we did not impose the no recall assumption, intertemporal inconsistency may arise in the firm’s problem. An
employed worker hired with initial experience x′ might want to quit and be rehired by the same firm in a future date
because of a more attractive contract. This would imply a different profit maximising strategy for the firm which much
complicates the analysis. Although in a different context, see McAfee (1995) for a version of this extension.
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subject to
V xi (0;w
x
i ) = V
x
i .
Let wx∗i (.;V xi ) denote this optimal contract and define Πx∗i (0;V xi ) as the expected profit per
new hire associated with it. The optimized steady state flow profit per new hire in the market of
unemployed workers of experience x is then given by
Ωx∗u (V
x
u , w
x∗
u ) = λµ(x)Π
x∗
u (0;V
x
u )
and the corresponding steady state flow profit per new hire in the market of employed workers of
experience x is given by
Ωx∗e (V
x
e , w
x∗
e ) = λG(V
x
e | x)Πx∗e (0;V xe ).
The firm then chooses V xi to maximise Ωx∗i . Let Ω
x
i denote the maximised value of Ωx∗i .
5 Optimal Wage Contracts
5.1 The Contracting Problem
Given a match is formed at any market, search frictions provide the firm with a dynamic monopoly
power that enables it to extract quasi rents from the worker. The latter is able to recover those rents
(or part of them) over time through job shopping. A moral hazard problem then arises since the
firm’s profit depends on the worker’s search strategies.9 Quits are jointly inefficient. As firms
cannot eliminate potential quits and workers are liquidity constraint, the optimal contract must
then minimises the worker’s quit rate by offering him an increasing share of the match rents.
9 However, as argued by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002 b), given workers cannot vary their search intensity, the
moral hazard problem is not fully addressed by the firm.
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In particular, when designing an optimal contract for a worker of employment status i and
initial experience x, each firm takes as given the distribution of outside offers for each i and ex-
perience x, the expected lifetime utility of unemployed workers, and the optimal quit strategy of
an employed worker given the contract offered. Formally, for each i = u, e the firm’s optimal
contracting problem is defined as
max
wxi (.)
∫ ∞
0
ψxi (t)[p(x + t)− wxi (t)]dt (6)
subject to
dV xi (t)
dt
= δV xi (t)− wxi (t)− λ
∫ V x+te
V xi (t)
[
V x+te − V xi (t)
]
dFe(V
x+t
e | x + t) (7)
dψxi (t)
dt
= − [δ + λ(1− Fe(V xi (t) | x + t))]ψxi (t) (8)
and the initial conditions
V xi (0) = V
x
i and ψxi (0) = 1 (9)
and
wxi (.) ≥ w; (10)
where (8) is obtained by differentiating (3) with respect to tenure (given an initial experience x)
and p(x + t) is determined exogenously.
Note that this optimisation problem describes a non-stationary programming problem. To help
simplify the analysis we use the following assumption which must be consistent with the equilib-
rium described in the next section.
A0 : The option of quitting into unemployment never binds on an optimal contract; i.e.
V xi (t;w
x∗
i ) > U(x + t) for all x + t > 0 and i = u, e.
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As outside offers are conditioned on experience for each employment status, the value of being
unemployed could increase sufficiently quickly with experience such that firms have to distort the
optimal contract to ensure V xi (t;wxi ) ≥ U(x + t) for all t > 0. We avoid this complication and
solve for the optimal contract by restricting attention only to the set of retaining contracts, where
wxi is a retaining contract if V xi (t;wxi ) ≥ U(x + t) and hence txi = ∞ for all x, t and i = u, e.
Let Jx(t) denote the maximum expected value of a match between a firm and an employed
worker of initial experience x at tenure t. Since by assumption firms do not engage in search,
Jx(t) also describes the expected lifetime utility of a worker of tenure t and starting experience
x that is paid wxi (t) = p(x + t) for all t and follows an optimal quit strategy. Note that such a
contract is the only one that guarantees that the worker’s privately optimal quit strategy is also
jointly efficient.10 Since this contract is optimal, it solves (6) conditional on V xi = Jx(0), then
Jx(t) > U(x + t) for all x + t > 0 and so Jx(t) solves the following Bellman equation11
δJx(t) = p(x + t) +
dJx(t)
dt
+ λ
∫ V x+te
Jx(t)
[V x+te − Jx(t)]dFe(V x+te | x + t). (11)
Given Jx(t) > U(x + t) for all x + t > 0, there exists positive match rents in each market.
Hence in the market of workers with employment status i and experience x, the firm will offer a
wage contract with starting payoff V xi ∈ [U(x), Jx(0)).
The following claim establishes useful boundary conditions for the expected value of employ-
ment, V xi (.;w
x
i ) under an optimal contract.
10 As the firm is receving zero payoff, this contract is jointly efficient because the firm is indifferent to an eventual
separation.
11 Note that (11) can then be rewritten as J˙x(t) − δJx(t) = p(x + t) and since p(.) is a bounded function of
experience and δ acts as a discount rate, the former describes a bounded first order differential equation that is solved
by Jx(t) =
∫∞
t
e−δ(s−t)p(x + s)ds.
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CLAIM 1: Given A0, for an employment status i = u, e, any initial experience x and conditional
on a V xi ∈ [U(x), Jx(0)) and a profile Fe(. | κ) for all κ ≥ x, an optimal contract implies
U(x + t) < V xi (t;w
x∗
i ) ≤ Jx(t) for all t > 0.
Proof: For a given i = u, e, fix an x, an initial starting payoff V xi ∈ [U(x), Jx(0)) and a profile
Fe(. | κ) for all κ ≥ x.
(i) Note that U(x + t) < V xi (t;wx∗i ) for all t > 0 follows directly from assumption A0.
(ii) Next, suppose there exists a tenure t′ > 0 such that V xi (t′;wx∗i ) > Jx(t′). Since V xi (0;wx∗i ) <
Jx(0) and V xi (.;wx∗i ) is continuous over t there exists an s ∈ (0, t′) such that V xi (s;wx∗i ) = Jx(s).
However, at that tenure the optimal contract implies wxi (t) = p(x + t) for all t ≥ s and therefore
V xi (.;w
x∗
i ) = J
x(.) for all t ≥ s contradicting the optimality of wx∗i . ‖
5.2 Step-Contracts
Since Fi(. | x) might have mass points at any x, standard dynamic optimisation techniques cannot
be applied to obtain necessary or sufficient conditions that could help characterise the optimal
contract. However, A0 imply that we can use similar arguments as in Stevens (2004). Given the
worker is risk neutral and hence there is no gain in smoothing income, Proposition 1 shows that
in equilibrium for an employment status i and experience x the optimal contract is described by a
step-contract. In particular, the optimal contract is fully characterised by a promotion tenure z and
wages paid satisfy:
wxi (t) = w for t < z, (12)
wxi (t) = p(x + t) for t ≥ z;
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and the promotion tenure z is chosen so that the value of accepting the contract is V xi .
PROPOSITION 1: Given A0, for any employment status i = u, e, any initial experience x and
conditional on V xi ∈ [U(x), Jx(0)) and a profile Fe(. | κ) for all κ ≥ x, the optimal contract is a
step-contract.
Proof: See Appendix.
Note that as long as V xi (t;wxi ) < Jx(t) for some t, any contract wxi will generate inefficient
quit behaviour, where a quit is jointly inefficient if the outside offer has value V x+te < Jx(t). The
proof of Proposition 1 relies on showing that an optimal contract maximises the expected profit per
new hire by simply maximising the growth rate of V xi (t;wxi ) and hence minimising the deadweight
loss caused by inefficient quit behaviour. This is acheived by a contract such as (12).
The step-contract property is useful as a firm’s optimal contract for each i, x is now fully
described by a singleton, z. The worker quits if an outside offer that promises an earlier promotion
date is received. To simplify the analysis, we use the following renormalisation. Consider an
employed worker hired from state i and with initial experience x. Define T xi = x + z as the
accumulated experience when promotion arrives. Note that the step-contract offer z is equivalent
to promotion when the worker’s accumulated experience x + t reaches T xi . This renormalisation
is convenient since outside offers are conditioned on experience. A worker then quits if and only
if he receives an outside offer at experience x′ < T xe , where the corresponding promotion offer
T x
′
e = x
′ + z′ satisfies T x′e < T xi .
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6 Market Equilibrium
Given step-contracts as described in the previous section, we define the following notation. Let
Vi(x, T
x
i ) denoted the expected value of an employed worker hired from state i = u, e with expe-
rience x on a step-contract T xi ; i.e. the worker will be promoted after z = T xi − x further units of
time (if the worker does not quit). Let Πi(x, T xi ) denote the corresponding firm’s expected profit.
For workers of employment status i and experience x, the distribution of offers is described by
Fi(T
x
i | x), where Fi(. | x) describes the probability that an outside offer implies promotion at
accumulated experience no greater than T xi . Let T xi and T
x
i be the infimum and supremum of the
support for each i, x. Note that offers always satisfy T xi ≥ x. Also, conditional on experience
x ≥ 0, let 1−G(T xi | x) denote the proportion of employed workers on a step-contract of at least
T xi .
In the market for unemployed workers of experience x, a firm then offers T xu to maximise
expected steady state flow profit per new hire
Ωxu(T
x
u , x) = λµ(x)Πu(x, T
x
u ).
Similarly, in the market of employed workers with experience x, a firm offers T xe to maximise
expected steady state flow profit per new hire
Ωxe(T
x
e , x) = λ[1−G(T xe | x)]Πe(x, T xe ).
DEFINITION: A Market Equilibrium in step-contracts requires:
(a) an employed worker (x, T xe ) quits if an outside offer T x′e < T xe is received;
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(b) optimal job search by unemployed workers of experience x, where
δU(x) = b + λ
∫ Txu
Txu
max[Vu(x, T
x
u )− U(x), 0]dFu(T xu | x),
and an unemployed worker with experience x accepts offer T xu if and only if Vu(x, T xu ) ≥ U(x).
(c) assumption A0 is satisfied.
(d) µ(x) and G(. | x) are consistent with the distribution of contract offers Fi(. | x) and the
optimal quit turnover strategies for each i, x;
(e) steady state profit per new hire satisfies
Ωxi (T
x
i , x) = Ω
x
i for all T xi in the support of Fi(. | x),
≤ Ωxi otherwise, for i = u, e.
We construct an equilibrium where all outside offers are deterministic.12 Note that A0 re-
quires that once an unemployed worker with no previous experience is hired, he will not quit to
unemployment at any positive experience. This implies then that in the constructed equilibrium
µ(x) = 0 for all x > 0 and µ(0) = M(0) determines the total number of unemployed. Given this
condition, let T 0∗u denote the optimal contract offered to unemployed workers with no experience
and T ∗e (x) denote the optimal contract offered to an employed worker with experience x > 0. Op-
timality implies T ∗e < T 0∗u for all experiences x < T 0∗u (otherwise the offer is rejected by workers
hired from unemployment and the firm makes zero profit). Moreover, let T ∗e have the following
12 Although an equilibrium with non-degenerate outside offers may exist, it is not trivial to construct one. Given A0,
it can be shown that if Fu(. | 0) is assumed continuous with connected support
[
T 0u, T
0
u
]
, the profile Fe(. | x) around
x = 0 must be degenerate. By constructing a candidate equilibrium in which all Fe(. | x) defined for x < T 0u are
degenerate it can be shown using a contradiction argument that the only Fu(. | 0) consistent with the profile Fe(. | x)
is degenerate at T 0u.
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properties:
A1: For x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ), T ∗e is continuously differentiable with
(a) T ∗e (0) = T < T 0∗u ,
(b) it is strictly increasing with T ∗e (x) > x, and
(c) limx→T 0∗u T ∗e (x) = T 0∗u .
That is, outside offers are such that firms offer two type of jobs conditioning on employment
status. A “bad” job -T 0∗u contracts- to unemployed workers with no experience and “good” jobs
-T ∗e contracts- to employed workers. Only those workers hired under T 0∗u contracts quit to firms
that offer T ∗e contracts. Once a worker is hired under a T ∗e contract he stays in that firm until
retirement.
However, note it must be shown that this outside offer structure is consistent with assumption
A0 and no employed worker of positive experience is willing to quit into unemployment. To do so
we analyse the out-of-equilibrium-path strategies of firms. We show that, given A1, the optimal
T xu firms will offer to any potential unemployed worker of positive experience is such that A0 is
satisfied.
7 Identifying a Market Equilibrium
7.1 Firms’ Contract Offers
Given A1 and that at market x = 0 it is optimal to offer T 0∗u to unemployed workers, we char-
acterise the optimal contract offers to employed workers for all x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ) given they behave
optimally. To do this, we first describe the firm’s expected profit given an employed worker with
experience x is employed on contract T xe and then consider G. Equilibrium outside offers T ∗e are
18
then characterise. Given the latter, we show that T 0∗u is indeed optimal. Without any loss of gener-
ality let w = 0.
Step 1: Consider any market x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ) such that T xe ≥ T 0∗u , which will be the least generous
contract offer in the market. As long as it is never optimal for the worker to quit into unemploy-
ment, the firm makes expected profit
Πe(x, T
x
e ) =
∫ Txe
x
e−(λ+δ)(s−x)p(s)ds if T xe ≥ T 0∗u , (13)
where the worker quits if an outside offer is received before T xe , and the firm pays marginal revenue
product after T xe − x further units of time. Note that Πe is strictly increasing in T xe . Hence a
necessary condition for a market equilibrium, so that firms do not offer T xe > T 0∗u , is that a worker
prefers to remain unemployed rather than accept a contract T 0u > T 0∗u . We shall return to this
condition later (see Claim 6 below). However, note this implies µ(0) = δ/(δ + λ) describes the
unemployment rate.
Next consider a market x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ) such that T xe ≤ T , which is the most generous contract.
As T ∗e ≥ T for all x > 0, a worker will never quit and the firm makes expected profit
Πe(x, T
x
e ) =
∫ Txe
x
e−δsp(s)ds if T xe ≤ T .
As Πe is strictly increasing in T xe , it follows that offering T xe < T is never optimal.
Consider now a market x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ) in which a firm which makes contract offer T xe ∈ (T , T 0∗u ).
Define κ where T xe = T ∗e (κ). There are two cases depending on whether x exceeds κ. First suppose
x < κ. Conditional on hiring the worker, A1 implies the firm’s expected profit is:
Πe(x, T
x
e ) =
∫ κ
x
e−(λ+δ)(s−x)p(s)ds + e−(λ+δ)(κ−x)
∫ Txe
κ
e−δ(s−κ)p(s)ds if x < κ,
19
as the worker quits for experiences x + s < κ, does not quit thereafter, and the firm makes zero
profit for experiences x + s ≥ T xe .
Now suppose x > κ. The firm’s expected profit (conditional on a hire and A1) is
Πe(x, T
x
e ) =
∫ Txe
x
e−δ(s−x)p(s)ds if x > κ,
as the worker never quits to an outside offer. Differentiating with respect to T xe and some re-
arranging establishes the following useful result.
CLAIM 2. At any experience x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ) and for T xe ∈ (T , T 0∗u ) :
∂Πe
∂T xe
= e−(λ+δ)(κ−x)
[
−λ
∫ Txe
κ
e−δ(s−κ)p(s)ds
dT ∗e (κ)/dx
+ p(T xe )e
−δ(Txe −κ)
]
for x < κ,
∂Πe
∂T xe
= p(T xe )e
−δ(Txe −x) for x > κ,
where κ is defined by T ∗e (κ) = T xe .
A marginal increase in T xe increases expected profit by the marginal revenue product of the
worker at experience T xe , p(T xe ), multiplied by the probability that he remains employed at the
firm until promotion date T xe . The loss, however, is that the worker is more likely to quit. In this
case the firm (conditional on the worker receiving an outside offer) looses the profits that otherwise
would have obtain from delaying the worker’s promotion date.
To characterise the optimal contract offer, we also need to describe G, the equilibrium distri-
bution of worker’s reservation values.
CLAIM 3. At any experience x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ) :
1−G(T 0∗u | x) = e−λx
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and for T xe ∈ (T , T 0∗u ) :
∂G(T xe | x)/∂T xe = 0, [1−G(T xe | x)] = e−λx for x < κ,
∂G(T xe | x)/∂T xe = λe−λκ/[dT ∗e (κ)/dx], [1−G(T xe | x)] = e−λκ for x > κ,
,where κ is defined by T ∗e (κ) = T xe .
Proof: See Appendix.
Notice that neither marginal profit ∂Πe/∂T xe nor the density function ∂G/∂T xe are continuous
at T xe = T
∗
e (x). In what follows consider left and right differentiation.
Step 2: Recall that T ∗e (.) describes the equilibrium offer strategies of firms hiring employed work-
ers of positive experience. Equilibrium also requires that T ∗e (x) describes the firms’ optimal con-
tract offer for all x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ). To show this is the case, fix a x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ) and recall A0 implies
the expected profit by offering contract T xe ∈ (T , T 0∗u ) is
Ωe(T
x
e , x) = λ[1−G(T xe | x)]Πe(x, T xe ).
(a) Right differentiation: consider T xe ∈ (T ∗e (x), T 0∗u ). Claims 2 and 3 imply
∂Ωe
∂T xe
= − ∂G
∂T xe
Πe(x, T
x
e ) + [1−G(T xe | x)]
∂Πe
∂T xe
= e−λxe−(λ+δ)(κ−x)
[
−λ
∫ Txe
κ
e−δ(s−κ)p(s)ds
dT ∗e (κ)/dx
+ p(T xe )e
−δ(Txe −κ)
]
.
Hence a necessary condition for optimality is that limε→0+ [∂Ωe(T ∗e + ε, x)/∂T xe ] ≤ 0, otherwise
offering a T xe > T ∗e (x) is optimal. This implies
− λ
dT ∗(x)/dx
∫ T ∗e (x)
x
e−δ(s−x)p(s)ds + p(T ∗e (x))e
−δ(T ∗e (x)−x) ≤ 0.
(b) Left differentiation: consider T xe ∈ (T , T x∗e (x)). Claims 2 and 3 imply
∂Ωe
∂T xe
= − ∂G
∂T xe
Πe(x, T
x
e ) + [1−G(T xe | x)]
∂Πe
∂T xe
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= − λe
−λκ
dT ∗e (κ)/dx
∫ Txe
x
e−δ(s−x)p(s)ds + e−λκ[p(T xe )e
−δ(Txe −x)].
and a necessary condition for optimality is that limε→0+ [∂Ωe(T ∗e − ε, x)/∂T xe ] ≥ 0, otherwise
offering a T xe < T ∗e (x) is optimal. This implies
− λ
dT ∗e (x)/dx
∫ T ∗e (x)
x
e−δ(s−x)p(s)ds + p(T ∗e (x))e
−δ(T ∗e (x)−x) ≥ 0.
Hence the necessary conditions for the optimality of T xe = T ∗e (x) are satisfied if and only if
p(T xe )e
−δ(Txe −x) =
λ
∫ Txe
x
e−δ(s−x)p(s)ds
dT ∗e (x)/dx
Rearranging this expression implies T ∗e must satisfy
dT ∗e (x)
dx
=
λ
∫ T ∗e (x)
x
e−δ(s−x)p(s)ds
p(T ∗e (x))e−δ(T
∗
e (x)−x) (14)
for any given x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ). Hence equilibrium requires that T ∗e is described by the non-autonomous
differential equation (14) for all x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ), subject to the initial condition T ∗e (0) = T . Given the
properties of p, the fundamental theorem of differential equations imply T ∗e exists, is continuously
differentiable in x and strictly increasing if x < T ∗e (x). A1 also requires limx→T 0∗u T
∗
e (x) = T
0∗
u .
As in any initial value problem, the stability of T ∗e and hence the existences of a fixed point T 0∗u
will depend on the value of the initial condition, T ∗e (0) = T . In the appendix we show, using
simulations, that there exists an upper bound, T̂ 1, defined by
e−δ
T 1p(T̂ 1) = λ
∫
T 1
0
e−δsp(s)ds,
such that for any value of T < T̂ 1, T ∗e converges to the fixed point T 0∗u .
PROPOSITION 2. A necessary condition for a market equilibrium with T ∗e satisfying A1 re-
quires:
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(a) T ∈ (0, T̂ 1),
(b) conditional on such a T , T ∗e is the solution to the differential equation (14) with initial value
T ∗e (0) = T ,and
(c) T 0∗u is determined where dT ∗e (x)/dx = 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
Note (14) describes how outside offers for employed workers must vary with experience in
a market equilibrium. Under the conditions stated in Proposition 2 outside offers become more
generous with experience. The offered promotion tenure, z∗ = T ∗e (x)−x, decreases with previous
experience x (see Figure 1). This guarantees that accumulating experience is valuable. More
importantly, in the appendix we show that this property is maintained even if p(x) = p for all
x. Hence, when a worker’s productivity is not correlated with experience firms might still post
outside offers that become more generous with experience. Also note that since z∗ > 0 for all
x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ), T ∗e (x) > x for such Te. (14) then implies T ∗e is strictly increasing in x for x < T 0∗u .
Hence a solution to the conditions of Proposition 2 yields a T ∗e which satisfies A1.
The next claim shows that Proposition 2 also implies firms offering promotions T ∗e at any
market x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ) are indifferent to increase (marginally) their promotion date T ∗e (x). Thus,
when posting contract T ∗e (x) at any market x > 0 firms trade off a longer period during which they
make positive profit with a higher chance the worker will quit in the future.
CLAIM 4. Given a T ∗e satisfying Proposition 2, then
∂Ωxe
∂T xe
= 0 for all T xe > T ∗e (x);
∂Ωxe
∂T xe
> 0 for all T xe < T ∗e (x)
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Figure 1: Stability of Outside Offers, z∗, for Initial Values of z∗ = [15, . . . , 30]
i.e. Proposition 2 is sufficient as well as necessary.
Proof: See Appendix.
Step 3: Given that at market x = 0+ is optimal to set T , then at market x = 0 firms can always
deviate from T 0∗u by posting a step-contract T 0u = T and retain all the workers. Hence, optimality
of T 0∗u requires that Πu(0, T 0∗u ) ≥ Πu(0, T ). However, at x = 0+ firms then can still deviate by
posting a step-contract T 0+e = T 0∗u − ε, where ε > 0 is arbitrarily small. Note that this contract
attracts the worker with probability one. Hence, optimality of T at x = 0+ requires Πu(0, T ) ≥
Πu(0, T
0∗
u − ε) for any ε > 0. Continuity then implies that Πu(0, T 0∗u ) = Πu(0, T ) must hold in
equilibrium.
CLAIM 5. Given a T ∗e satisfying Proposition 2, then
Πu(0, T
0
u ) = Πu for all T 0u ∈ [T , T 0∗u ].
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Proof: See Appendix.
We now turn to analyse the behaviour of workers given the optimal strategies of firms.
7.2 Workers’ Quit Strategies
Given that at market x = 0 it is optimal for firms to offer T 0∗u and that at markets x > 0 firms’
optimal contract offers are described by a T ∗e satisfying Proposition 2, the next step is to compute
the worker’s expected payoffs. First, fix a step-contract T ∗e (κ) ∈ (T , T 0∗u ) and note only workers
that where hired from unemployment who quit with experience κ are employed on this contract.
Now consider such a worker and with no loss of generality consider experience x ≥ κ. Assuming
it is never optimal for the worker to quit into unemployment, and noting that T ∗e (x) > T ∗e (κ) for
all x > κ implies the worker never quits, the worker’s expected lifetime payoff is:
V (x, T ∗e (κ)) = e
−δ(T ∗e (κ)−x)
∫ ∞
T ∗e (κ)
e−δ(s−T
∗
e (κ))p(s)ds, (15)
as the worker receives a zero wage until promoted, and earns marginal revenue product thereafter.
Note V is increasing and convex in x for x < T ∗e (κ).
Now consider the expected payoff of a worker employed under contract T 0∗u , the least generous
contract. Assuming the worker never quits into unemployment, equilibrium implies the expected
lifetime payoff at experience x < T 0∗u is
V (x, T 0∗u ) = λ
∫ T 0∗u
x
e−(λ+δ)(s−x)V (s, T ∗e (s))ds + e
−(λ+δ)(T 0∗u −x)
∫ ∞
T 0∗u
e−δ(s−T
0∗
u )p(s)ds, (16)
where
V (s, T ∗e (s)) = e
−δ(T ∗e (s)−s)
∫ ∞
T ∗e (s)
e−δ(τ−T
∗
e (s))p(τ)dτ , (17)
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is the starting payoff offered by a contract T ∗e at market s ∈ (x, T 0∗u ). Under this contract the
worker also gets paid a zero wage until promotion and marginal revenue product thereafter, but
before promotion arrives (which happens after T 0∗u − x units of time) he might quit to a contract
T ∗e (s) and receive V (s, T ∗e (s)). Note that in this case V (x, T 0∗u ) is also strictly increasing and
convex in x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ) as outside offers get more generous with experience.13
Finally, consider an unemployed worker of experience x. In general, the expected value of
unemployment is given by
δU(x) = b + λmax [V (x, T ∗u (x))− U(x), 0] for all x ≥ 0,
where T ∗u (x) are the optimal contract firms offer to unemployed workers. Conditional on A0, note
that when constructing the firms’ outside offers we have only define T ∗u (0) = T 0∗u . Equilibrium
requires that an unemployed worker must be just indifferent to accept the least generous offer, T 0∗u .
Otherwise, equation (13) implies that firms could increase profits by offering T 0∗u +ε, where ε > 0
is arbitrarily small. The next claim follows.
CLAIM 6. A necessary condition for a market equilibrium is that
U(0) = Vu(0, T
0∗
u ) = b/δ (18)
and unemployed workers get no surplus.
However, to show that A0 is satisfied in equilibrium and no employed worker will quit to
unemployment at positive experience, we have to define the optimal offers firms would offer un-
employed workers of experience x > 0, T ∗u (x). Given optimal outside offers for employed workers
13 See Van den Berg (1990)-Theorem 2 for a similar argument when the distribution of outside offers increase in
the sense of first order stochastic dominance.
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at positive experience are degenerate and described by T ∗e satisfying Proposition 2, consider an un-
employed worker of experience x > 0. Since firms can observe this worker’s employment status,
it follows that the optimal T xu will imply Vu(0, T xu ) = U(x) for any x > 0. Firms have no incentive
to improve this offer since they have a constant hiring rate, λµ(x), and the worker will accept any
contract that gives him at least U(x) and quit as soon as a T ∗e contract arrives. Hence this implies
U(x) = b/δ for all x. However, these strategies are never materialised and only act as a credible
threat to the worker.
Since the expected value of unemployment can be regarded as constant over time and V (x, T 0∗u )
is strictly increasing in x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ), Claim 6 implies the option of quitting into unemployment
never binds at contracts T 0∗u . Moreover, Claim 7 below gives a sufficient condition such that this is
also true for contract T ∗e (x) at any x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ).
CLAIM 7. Given a T ∗e satisfying Proposition 2, workers employed on a T ∗e (x) contract will never
quit to unemployment if and only if T ∗e (0) = T < T̂ 2, where T̂ 2 is defined by∫ ∞
T 2
e−δsp(s)ds = b/δ.
Proof: Consider a T ∗e satisfying Proposition 2. Note V (x, T ∗e (x)) is strictly increasing in x
and U(x) is given by b/δ for all x. Hence, workers hired under T ∗e contracts at any market x ∈
(0, T 0∗u ) will never quit to unemployment if and only if V (x, T ∗e (x)) > b/δ at experience x = 0+.
Evaluating (17) at T ∗e (0+) this implies that T must also satisfy∫ ∞
T
e−δsp(s)ds > b/δ. (19)
By defining T̂ 2 as the value of T that makes
∫∞
T
e−δsp(s)ds = b/δ we obtain the condition stated
in the claim.‖
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Given a T ∗e that satisfies Proposition 2, the conditions in Claim 6 and 7 imply unemployed
workers with no previous experience hired under contract T 0∗u and employed workers hired under
contract T ∗e never quit to unemployment. Hence, existence of equilibrium is guaranteed if and
only if there exists a T ∗e such that Proposition 2, Claim 6 and Claim 7 are simultaneously satisfied.
In particular, Proposition 2 and Claim 7 imply that any equilibrium T ∗e must be a solution to (14)
subject to the initial condition T ∗e (0) < T̂ 1 and T ∗e (0) < T̂ 2. Claim 6 and (16) then require that
these solutions also satisfy
λ
∫ T 0∗u
0
e−(λ+δ)sV (s, T ∗e (s))ds + e
−(λ+δ)T 0∗u
∫ ∞
T 0∗u
e−δ(s−T
0∗
u )p(s)ds =
b
δ
,
where V (s, T ∗e (s)) is given by (17). However, since (14) cannot be solved explicitly for T ∗e we do
not provide an existence proof but instead analyse the model numerically to show existence.
7.3 Numerical Analysis
Without any loss of generality assume the function p takes the following exponential form
p(x) = p− p0e−αx for all x ≥ 0, (20)
where p > p0 > 0 and α > 0. Note α describes the worker’s “learning” rate (a high α implies
workers acquire human capital faster) and p determines the maximum human capital stock any
worker could achieve.
Next we show that if U = b/δ is sufficiently close to J0(0) =
∫∞
0
e−δsp(s)ds and λ is small
enough, there exists a unique solution, T ∗e , to (14) such that the conditions in Proposition 2, Claim
6 and 7 are simultaneously satisfied. We then consider comparative statics.
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7.3.1 Existence
Substituting out for p(x) in (14) outside offers are now described by
dT ∗e (x)
dx
=
pλ
δ
(1− e−δ(T ∗e (x)−x)) + p0 λα+δeδx(e−(α+δ)T
∗
e (x) − e−(α+δ)x)
e−δ(T ∗e (x)−x)(p− p0e−αT ∗e (x)) , (21)
subject to the initial condition T ∗e (0) = T such that T < T̂ 1 and T < T̂ 2, where T̂ 1 is defined by
pe−δ
T 1
[
1 +
λ
δ
]
− p0e−(α+δ)T 1
[
1 +
λ
α + δ
]
= λ
[
p
δ
− p0
α + δ
]
,
and T̂ 2 solves
p
δ
e−δ
T 2 − p0
α + δ
e−(α+δ)
T 2 =
b
δ
.
Claim 6 then requires any equilibrium T ∗e to also satisfy
λ
∫ T 0∗u
0
e−λs
[
p
δ
e−δT
∗
e (s) − p0
α + δ
e−(α+δ)T
∗
e (s)
]
ds + e−(λ+δ)T
0∗
u
[
p
δ
− p0
α + δ
e−αT
0∗
u
]
=
b
δ
. (22)
Assuming p = 20, p0 = 3, b = 14.5, δ = 0.01, λ = 0.04 and α = 0.1, Figures 2 and 3 show
the unique solutions for T ∗e and z∗. Figure 4 shows the corresponding solutions for V (x, T 0∗u ) and
V (x, T ∗e (x)) given U and J0(x). Note that with these parameter values T̂ 1 = 23.3, T̂ 2 = 32.1,
T = 19.5, T 0∗u = 41.7.
14
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. First, note that as long as 0 < T < T̂ 1
and hence a T 0∗u exists, (21) implies T ∗e (x) increases continuosly with T for all x ∈ [0, T 0∗u ]. In
14 To show existence numerically, we apply the following algorithm. Given any T satisfying Proposition 2(a) and
T < T̂ 2, solve (14) given the initial condition T ∗e (0) = T such that its solution, T ∗e , implies a function V (x, T 0∗u ) that
solves
dV (x, T 0∗u )
dx
= (λ + δ)V (x, T 0∗u )− λV (x, T ∗e (x)) for all x ∈ [0, T 0∗u ).
given the boundary conditions V (0, T 0∗u ) = b/δ and V (T 0∗u , T 0∗u ) =
∫∞
T 0∗u
e−δ(s−T
0∗
u )p(s)ds and also satisfies (22).
29
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Te
*(x
)
x
Figure 2: Equilibrium Outside Offers at Positive Experience Markets, T ∗e (.)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
x
Z*
(x)
=T
e*
(x)
−x
Figure 3: Equilibrium Outside Offers at Positive Experience Markets, z∗(.).
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terms of Figure 2, the function T ∗e shifts upwards. It then follows that, V (0, T 0∗u ) -the LHS of
(22)- must be continuous and strictly decreasing in T . On the other hand, equation (17) shows
that V (0, T ∗e (0)) -the LHS of (19)- is also continuous and strictly decreasing in T . Figure 5 shows
this relationship. The locuses MG and LG describe V (0, T ∗e (0)) and V (0, T 0∗u ), respectively for
the parameter values given above. Let V̂ denote the limit of V (0, T 0∗u ) as T → T̂ 1 and note (21)
implies that as T → 0, then T 0∗u → 0 and, hence, V (0, T 0∗u ) → J0(0). Equation (17) shows that
V (0, T ∗e (0)) also converges to J0(0) as T → 0. Finally, note that T 0∗u > T > 0 implies V (0, T ∗e (0))
is strictly greater than V (0, T 0∗u ) for any given T ∈ (0, T̂ 1).
It follows from Figure 5 that for any value of U = b/δ ∈ (V̂ , J0(0)) there exists a unique T ′
satisfying T ′ < T̂ 1 and T ′ < T̂ 2 such that the corresponding solution, T ∗′e , to (21) solves (22).
However, as shown below, V̂ increases with λ and hence for values of λ high enough there is no
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Figure 5: Existence of Equilibrium. Given the parameter values mentioned in the text, on the
horizontal-axis, we find that T ∗e (0) = T ′ = 19.5, T̂ 1 = 23.3 and T̂ 2 = 32.1. On the vertical-axis,
V̂ = 1280, U = 1450 and J0(0) = 1972.7.
b < p(0) such that equilibrium outside offers T ∗e exists.
7.3.2 Comparative Statics
Note that Figure 5 implies for any b ∈ (δV̂ , p(0)), b and T ∗e are inversely related. As b decreases
(and U decreases), firms at x = 0 market are able to attract unemployed workers by offering
them a contract with a longer probation period. Since poaching firms at any market x > 0 will
also increase their promotion dates, a decrease (increase) in b shifts outwards (inwards) T ∗e for all
x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ). Table 1 shows this relationship for the same parameter values as above.
Similarly, Table 2 shows the relationship between λ and T ∗e . When search frictions increase
(λ gets smaller), equation (21) implies that dT ∗e /dx decreases for all x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ) and promotion
dates offered by good jobs at positive experience markets converge to the ones offered by bad
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jobs; i.e. T ∗(x) → T 0∗u for all x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ). In the limit, equilibrium converges to the pure
monopoly case. On the other hand, as frictions disappear T̂ 1 decreases. This implies that T must
also decrease. At the same time workers hired in bad jobs have more opportunities to get a better
job before promotion, more markets open and hence T 0∗u increases. However, as mentioned earlier,
an increase in λ also increases Vˆ and hence reduces the set of values of b for which equilibrium
can exists. In this case, equilibrium fails to exist for λ > 0.05. For those cases V̂ > U.
Finally, Table 3 shows the relationship between α and T ∗e . Note that for the initial values of
α, an increases in the learning rate of workers increases both T and T 0∗u . As workers increase
their productivity over a long time span, firms find profitable to increase their probation period and
obtain higher match rents. However, as α reaches a value of 5% there is hardly any change in T ∗e .
At this point most of the increase in productivity has been achieved and hence there is barely any
impact on the firm’s contract.
Table 1 Table 2 Table 3
b T T 0∗u T̂ 2
12.9 22.5 106.6 43.8
13.5 21.6 63.6 39.3
14.5 19.5 41.6 32.1
15.5 16.9 24.7 22.2
16.5 13.9 20.6 19.1
16.9 12.6 17.6 16.6
λ T T 0∗u T̂ 1 V̂
0.005 29.4 32.0 110.5 223
0.01 27.3 32.3 70 502
0.02 24.1 33.9 41.8 887
0.03 21.6 36.8 29.9 1125
0.04 19.5 41.6 23.3 1280
0.05 17.7 52.4 19.1 1386
α T T 0∗u T̂ 1 T̂ 2
0 12.1 16.8 22.3 15.9
0.01 17.2 30.7 22.7 26.2
0.05 19.3 40.6 23.2 31.7
0.1 19.4 41.7 23.3 32.1
0.5 19.5 42.0 23.4 32.2
1 19.5 42.1 23.5 32.2
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8 Interpretation and Conclusions
We have constructed an equilibrium in which firms post wage-tenure contracts conditional on the
worker’s employment status and initial experience. As is Stevens (2004) the firm is able to wage
discriminate its employees by their tenure by first setting a probation period in which the worker is
paid the minimum acceptable wage, w. After this period, the worker is promoted and paid marginal
revenue product, p(x). In equilibrium, firms hire workers with no previous experience from un-
employment. In this market firms extract all the match rents from the workers; i.e. the Diamond
outcome (see Diamond, 1971). Since these workers earn less than their marginal revenue prod-
uct until they get promoted, firms have incentives to recruit them at positive experience markets
(0 < x < T 0∗u ). Proposition 2 then shows that if T < T̂ 1, equilibrium outside offers become more
generous with experience. This result is solely determined by tenure effects driven by search fric-
tions and is independent of the worker’s human capital accumulation. As the experience-earnings
profile of workers hired under a T 0∗u contract increases steeply during the probation period, firms
at markets x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ) must offer contracts with increasing starting values if they are going to
successfully recruit these workers before promotion arrives (see Figure 4). In this case, firms find
profitable to offer employed workers with positive experience more than their reservation value.
Firms trade off a longer period during which they make positive profit with a higher chance the
worker will quit in the future (Claim 5). Hence, a “dual” labour market emerges within a firm in
which worker turnover occurs in the direction of bad jobs with longer probation periods towards
good jobs with shorter ones.
Note step-contracts are the unique optimal wage-tenure contract in this framework, since firms
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always face outside competition for their employees. Moreover, by using step-contracts in positive
experience markets firms successfully create an internal labour market that shields their employees
from outside competition as workers hired under T ∗e contracts never quit.
There is evidence that firms segment the labour market internally offering two types of jobs
(see Doeringer and Piore (1971) and Saint-Paul (1996)). In the upper tier of their labour market
firms create an internal labour market offering high wages, employment stability and promotions.
The lower tier is characterised by low wages and a high degree of turnover. We argue that search
frictions alone can give an alternative explanation of why this “dual” labour market might appear
within a firm. In our model, profit maximising firms exploit their monopsony power and offer a
low paying job to an unemployed worker with no previous experience and a high paying one to an
employed with positive experience because it knows the former does not have an outside option
while the latter does. This is in contrast is the typical explanations based on efficiency wages and
the existence of monitoring cost.
Since more experienced workers are offered contracts with higher starting values, the model
predicts cohort effects within a firm. Figure 4 implies that the expected value of employment of
two workers hired at experiences x and x′ follow a common pattern that is independent of outside
offers. Hence, much of the variation between cohort’s expected value of employment implied by
the earnings distribution G (see Claim 3) comes from the difference in starting payoff described
by V (x, T ∗e (x)) and persists until promotion arrives. Through simulations we have further derived
the impact of changes in market conditions on equilibrium outside offers and hence on how these
cohort effects behave when frictions, unemployment insurance payments and the learning rate of
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workers change.
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) find some empirical support for this prediction. Using
personnel data of a mayor US corporation during the period 1969-1988 they find strong evidence
of cohort effects that depend on the year in which workers where hired. In their study, employee’s
wages of different cohorts follow a common pattern (increasing and convex with tenure) and move
in parallel. New entrant wages, however, follow a more idiosyncratic and erratic path which is
described by external market conditions. Not surprisingly, they argue that these wage patterns are
consistent with wage policies found in the incentive/agency theory.
Furthermore, the earnings distribution also implies that inside a firm, holding tenure constant,
workers that where hired with more pre-company experience (experience gained outside the firm)
are higher in the earnings scale and when controlling for experience workers with more tenure
have higher earnings. These predictions are also consistent with the empirical findings of Med-
off and Abraham (1980). Their analysis of personnel data of two US manufacturing companies
shows that in both cases for managerial and professional employees there exists positive returns to
outside firm (pre-company) experience and positive returns to tenure when controlling for tenure
and experience, respectively. Interestingly, they find that these effects explain nearly 40% of wage
differentials found within a job level.
The results presented in this paper then suggest that allowing for more complex firm wage
policies in search equilibrium type of environments can proof useful to further understanding the
interaction between search frictions and the worker’s wage pattern inside the firm.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Assume workers do not quit into unemployment. For any employment status i = u, e and
initial experience x fix a V xi ∈ [U(x), Jx(0)) and profile Fe(. | κ) for all κ ≥ x.
Step 1: Define the “surplus function” for any market x + t as
ϕ(V xi (t) ;x + t) ≡
∫ V x+te
V xi (t)
[V x+te − V xi (t)]dFe(V x+te | x + t). (23)
Note that for a given Fe(. | x+ t), ϕ is continuous and non increasing in V xi (t) ∈ [U(x+ t), Jx(t)].
(7) then implies V xi (t) evolves according to the differential equation
dV xi (t)
dt
= −wxi (t) + δV xi (t)− λϕ(V xi (t) ;x + t), (24)
given a starting payoff V xi (0) = V xi ∈ [U(x), Jx(0)). Let V xbi (t) denote the solution to (24) when
the liquidity constraint (10) binds and V xnbi (t) when it does not. By subtracting the corresponding
differential equations we obtain the following expression
[
dV xbi (t)
dt
−dV
xnb
i (t)
dt
] =
[
wxnbi (t)− w
]
+δ[V xbi (t)−V xnbi (t)]−λ[ϕ(V xbi (t);x+t)−ϕ(V xnbi (t);x+t)].
(25)
Since V xi = V xbi (0) = V xnbi (0) by assumption, it follows from (25) that dV xbi (0)/dt > dV xnbi (0)/dt.
Continuity of V xi (.) and the properties of (23) then imply V xbi (t) > V xnbi (t) and dV xbi (t)/dt >
dV xnbi (t)/dt for all t.
Step 2: Note that at each tenure t the worker’s hazard rate, δ + λ[1 − Fe(V xi (t) | x + t)], is a
non increasing function of V xi (.). This implies the survival probability, ψxi (.), is a non decreasing
function of V xi (.). Furthermore, note that the firm’s profit flow per worker, [p(x + t) − wxi (t)], is
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a decreasing function of wxi (t). It then follows from Step 1 and Claim 1 that the firm maximises
expected profit per new hire given V xi by setting wxi (t) = w for those t in which V xi (t) < Jx(t).
When V xi (t) = Jx(t), say at t = z, the jointly efficient contract then pays marginal revenue
product. Hence the optimal contract is a step contract as described by (12), where the promotion
tenure, z, is determined by V xi (0;wxi (.)) = V xi .‖
Proof of Claim 3:
Consider first T 0∗u . As all starting offers imply T 0∗u then 1 − G(T 0∗u | 0) = 1. Further, as
T ∗e < T
0∗
u for x > 0, then conditional on remaining in the labour market, workers quit to T ∗e < T 0∗u
at rate λ. Hence 1−G(T 0∗u | x) = e−λx for 0 < x < T 0∗u .
Now fix a x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ) and a T xe ∈ (T , T 0∗u ). Define κ where T ∗e (κ) = T xe . If x < κ, then all
offers T ∗e (s) < T xe for all experiences s ∈ [0, x], and so ∂G/∂T xe = 0. It then follows from the
first part of the proof that 1−G(T xe | x) = e−λx.
Suppose instead x > κ. Steady state turnover implies for dx arbitrarily small
G(T ∗e (κ + dx) | x)−G(T ∗e (κ) | x) = λdx[1−G(T ∗e (κ + dx) | κ)] + O(dx2),
where conditional on remaining in the labour market, the proportion of workers on contract T xe ∈
[T ∗e (κ), T
∗
e (κ + dx)] at experience x are those who at experience κ and on contract T 0∗u received
an outside offer and so quit to a contract T κe ∈ [T ∗e (κ), T ∗e (κ + dx)]. But at experience κ, 1 −
G(T ∗e (κ + dx), κ) = e
−λκ. Dividing by dx and taking the limit dx → 0 implies the condition
stated in the Claim.
Finally, note that A1 implies that workers under contracts no greater than T ∗e (κ) will never quit
to an outside offer and that at experience κ, G(T ∗e (κ), κ) = 1− e−λκ. Hence, conditional on those
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workers remaining in the labour market at experience x, 1−G(T ∗e (κ), x) = e−λκ. ‖
Proof of Proposition 2:
Without any loss of generality assume p takes the following exponential form
p(x) = p− p0e−αx for all x ≥ 0,
where p > p0 > 0 and α > 0, where p determines the maximum human capital stock any worker
could achieve and α describes the worker’s “learning” rate. First consider the case of α = 0.
Workers do not accumulate human capital with experience and hence the marginal revenue product
is given by a constant p = p(0). In this case T ∗e is described by
dT ∗e (x)
dx
=
λ
δ
[
eδ(T
∗
e (x)−x) − 1] . (26)
subject to the initial condition T ∗e (0) = T , where T < T̂ 1 and T̂ 1 = ln(1 + δ/λ)1/δ is the value of
T ∗e (0) given by (26) when dT ∗e (0)/dx = 1. Let z∗ = T ∗e − x denote the corresponding promotion
tenure offered to a worker with experience x. In that case,
dz∗(x)
dx
=
λ
δ
[
eδz
∗ − 1]− 1, (27)
which must be solved subject to the boundary condition z∗ = T at x = 0. The corresponding
phase diagram implies that if T < T̂ 1, then z∗ is strictly decreasing for all x. Further T ∗e → T 0∗u as
x → T 0∗u , which requires z∗ → 0, and then T 0∗u > 0 is determined where z∗(T 0∗u ) = 0.
Assuming α > 0 and following the same procedure, numerical solutions of (14) give similar
diagrams for the corresponding z∗. In particular, letting p = 20, p0 = 3, λ = 0.04, δ = 0.01
and α = 0.1, Figure 1 (in the text) shows the behaviour of outside offers for several values of
z∗(0) = T . Note that in this case T̂ 1 = 23.3.
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Proof of Claim 4:
First consider T xe > T ∗e (x). Then
sign[
∂Ω∗e
∂T xe
] = sign[e−λxe−(λ+δ)(κ−x)
[
−λ
∫ Txe
κ
e−δ(s−κ)p(s)ds + [dT ∗e (κ)/dx] p(T
x
e )e
−δ(Txe −κ)
]
].
Substituting out dT ∗e (κ)/dx from (14) and using Proposition 2 implies the first part of the claim.
Now consider T xe < T ∗e (x),and so
sign[
∂Ω∗e
∂T xe
] = sign[−λ
∫ Txe
x
e−δ(s−x)p(s)ds + [dT ∗e (κ)/dx] p(T
x
e )e
−δ(Txe −x)].
Substituting out dT ∗e (κ)/dx gives
sign[
∂Ω∗e
∂T xe
] = sign[−λ
∫ Txe
x
e−δ(s−x)p(s)ds + λ
∫ Txe
κ
e−δ(s−κ)p(s)ds].
sign[
∂Ω∗e
∂T xe
] = sign[
∫ Txe
κ
e−δ(s−κ)p(s)ds−
∫ Txe
x
e−δ(s−x)p(s)ds] > 0
as κ < x. ‖
Proof of Claim 5:
Fix x = 0. Suppose a firm offers a contract T 0u ∈ [T , T 0∗u ] to an unemployed worker with
no experience. Define κ where T 0u = T ∗e (κ) such that T ∗e satisfies Proposition 2. Given A0 and
conditional on a hire, the firm makes expected profit
Πu(0, T
0
u ) =
∫ κ
0
e−(λ+δ)sp(s)ds + e−(λ+δ)κ
∫ T 0u
κ
e−δ(s−κ)p(s)ds (28)
as the worker quits for experience s < κ, does not quit thereafter, and the firm makes zero profits
for experiences s > T 0u . Differentiating the above equation with respect to T 0u yields
∂Πu(0, T
0
u )
∂T 0u
= e−(λ+δ)κ
[
−λ
∫ T 0u
κ
e−δ(s−κ)p(s)ds
dT ∗e (κ)/dx
+ p(T 0u )e
−δ(T 0u−κ)
]
.
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Using (14) to substitute out dT ∗e (κ)/dt such that T ∗e satisfies Proposition 2 leads to ∂Πu(0, T 0u )/∂T 0u =
0 which implies the condition stated in the claim.‖
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